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A number of recent studies suggest that some ‘vegetative state’ patients have 
been misdiagnosed, judging by their ability to follow commands and in some 
cases even communicate through brain activity. Such studies highlight the 
difficulty in forming a diagnosis based only on behavioral assessments. We think 
that neuroimaging and electrophysiology methods will be used more frequently 
in clinical settings, integrated with existing behavioral assessments. Such efforts 
are expected to lead to a more accurate understanding of individual patients’ 
cognitive abilities or even provide prognostic indicators. In terms of treatment 
planning (i.e., pain management and end-of-life decision-making), patients with 
disorders of consciousness are now offered the possibility of expressing their 
preferences by means of brain–computer interfaces. What remains to be clarified 
is the degree to which such indirect responses can be considered reliable and 
of legal representation.
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It is not always easy to detect unambiguous signs of 
consciousness in patients with limited behavioral 
responses, such as coma survivors. Here, we aim 
to discuss the challenges that neurologists and 
assisting personnel are facing when dealing 
with patients with disorders of consciousness 
(DOC) in terms of diagnosis, prognosis and 
medical treatment. We will see that behavioral 
assessment remains the gold standard for 
diagnosing comatose, unresponsive (‘vegetative’) 
patients and patients in a minimally conscious 
state (MCS). Considering the persistence of 
diagnostic error in clinical evaluation, we 
highlight the need for objective biomarkers 
through neuroimaging and electrophysiological 
technologies. These technologies do not only 
assist clinicians in terms of differential diagnosis 
and potential prognosis, but also provide patients 
with muscle-independent means to communicate 
with their environment. For the moment, such 
technological advances remain experimental 
and require standardization if they are to be 
used in clinical routine. Importantly, clinical 
reality requires fast and valid assessments at the 
single-patient level. We foresee that an integrative 
approach of multimodal testing will shed light 
on the individual patient’s pathophysiology and 
the underlying mechanisms. Eventually, new 
knowledge can lead to a redefinition of existing 
clinical taxonomies. Such advances are expected 
to lead to ethical and legal discussions, where 
patients’ competency will potentially need to 
be re-established in a context of contemporary 
technology usage (e.g., by brain–computer 
interfaces), which allows them to express their 
wishes and even end-of-life preferences.
Disorders of consciousness
Since the 1950s and the introduction of the 
mechanical ventilator in intensive care, patients 
who would have previously died from apnea 
can have their respiratory functions sustained. 
As a result, the concept of death evolved. In 
the 1960s, the medical society provided the 
neurocentric definition of brain death as a 
condition of irreversible unconsciousness, 
clinically evidenced by the loss of all brainstem 
reflexes and the demonstration of continuing 
cessation of respiration [1]. In many cases, 
patients survive (brain) death, but can end up in 
profound states of unconsciousness. Coma, for 
example, is a pathological state marked by severe 
and prolonged dysfunction of vigilance and 
consciousness (at least 1 h) [2]. Patients in this state 
show continuous absence of eye opening as well as 
the absence of any voluntary behavioral responses. 
Coma is a time-limited condition leading either 
to death, the recovery of consciousness or a 
‘vegetative state’ (VS). Patients in a VS open 
their eyes (giving the impression of sleep–wake 
cycles), but they are unaware of themselves and 
their environment because they do not show 
Future Neurol. (2013) 8(1)44 future science group
sustained, reproducible, purposeful or voluntary 
behavioral responses to sensory stimuli [3]. More 
recently, it has been recognized that some of the 
healthcare professionals, media and lay public feel 
uncomfortable using the unintended denigrating 
‘vegetable-like’ connotation (seemingly intrinsic 
to the term VS). Hence, the European Task 
Force on Disorders of Consciousness proposed 
the alternative name ‘unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome’ (UWS), a more neutral and descriptive 
term, pertaining to patients showing a number of 
clinical signs of unresponsiveness (i.e., without 
response to commands or oriented voluntary 
movements) in the presence of wakefulness [4]. 
Some patients will evolve from this condition 
to a MCS. MCS patients show inconsistent, 
but clearly discernible, signs of consciousness, 
such as command following or other purposeful 
behaviors (e.g., verbalizations, direct response 
to moving stimuli and visual pursuit) [5]. 
Considering the lack of a unique code for MCS, 
which may hamper scientific investigations, 
medical information retrieval, demographic 
and international analyses on prevalence and 
prognosis on DOC, we have recently proposed to 
subcategorize this clinical entity [6]. Mainly based 
on the linguistic abilities of MCS patients, and 
also supported by neuroanatomical data [7], we 
have recently subcategorized this entity as MCS+ 
(describing high-level behavioral responses such 
as command following or specific responses to 
linguistic content) and MCS (describing low-
level non-reflex behavior such as visual pursuit, 
localization of pain or appropriate smiling to 
emotional stimuli) [7]. Emergence from MCS is 
defined by the ability of these patients to reliably 
communicate or use objects in a functional way. 
There are situations, however, where conscious 
patients are quadriplegic and anarthric with fully 
preserved cognitive abilities that they can only 
communicate by using the movement of their 
eyes or eyelids. These patients are considered to 
have locked-in syndrome (LIS) [8]. Acute ventral 
pontine lesions in the brainstem are the most 
common cause for LIS. As such, LIS patients 
do not experience disturbed consciousness. 
Since patients with LIS are unable to speak or 
move the extremities, differential diagnosis from 
DOC is difficult and often delayed. As a result, 
the diagnosis of LIS can be missed, with the 
consequence that these patients are mistaken for 
being unconscious [9]. It can happen, then, that for 
some LIS patients, the only evidence for preserved 
consciousness is their ability to communicate 
via assisting technologies (i.e., functional MRI 
[fMRI], EEG or evoked potentials). As such, we 
have recently suggested that these LIS patients 
can be considered to have ‘functional LIS’ [6]. In 
other words, the term functional LIS is proposed 
for patients with a dissociation between extreme 
behavioral motor dysfunction and the identified 
preserved higher cognitive functions only 
measurable by functional imaging techniques.
Clinical assessment of patients with DOC
Clinical experience teaches that consciousness can 
be reduced to two dimensions, wakefulness and 
awareness [10]. Wakefulness is clinically evidenced 
by examining the presence of spontaneous or 
stimulus-induced eye opening. Awareness is 
clinically assessed by command following or by 
observing non-reflex behaviors (e.g., orientation 
to pain). We suggest that awareness can be 
further reduced to awareness of the environment 
(or ‘external awareness’), meaning the sensory or 
perceptual awareness of the external world, and to 
awareness of self (or ‘internal awareness’), referring 
to the mental processes that do not require the 
mediation of external stimuli or sensory input, 
such as mind wandering, daydreaming, inner 
speech and mental imagery [11]. Due to its first-
person nature, internal awareness is clinically 
more ill-defined and difficult to assess at the 
bedside. The existing behavioral scales, which are 
quick to administer and widely used in clinics, 
mainly focus on deducing external awareness. For 
example, the widely used Glasgow Coma Scale 
scores eye, verbal and motor responses to external 
stimuli [12]. The Full Outline of Unresponsiveness 
recognizes the difficulty to assess verbal responses, 
especially in cases of intubated patients or patients 
with tracheotomy, and requires patients to show 
non-verbal conscious behaviors, such as eye-
blinking or hand-signing to command. Thus, 
the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness can detect 
patients with LIS but cannot always differentiate 
UWS and MCS patients because it does not test 
all of the behavioral criteria required to diagnose 
MCS [13]. The Coma Recovery Scale – Revised is 
the most sensitive scale to differentiate UWS and 
MCS patients because it assesses auditory, visual, 
motor, oromotor and communication abilities 
next to arousal assessment, covering the diagnostic 
criteria for MCS [14]. Among the existing scales, 
the Coma Recovery Scale – Revised has been 
recommended as the most appropriate tool to 
evaluate patients with DOC [15].
To date, bedside evaluation remains the gold 
standard for diagnosing this clinical population. 
As we will discuss later, incorrect diagnosis in 
patients with DOC is not a rare phenomenon 
[16]. In order to minimize incorrect diagnostic 
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evaluation through behavioral observations, 
neuroimaging procedures have begun to assume 
an adjunctive role in the diagnostic assessment 
of patients with DOC.
Neuroimaging & electrophysiology
Over the years, developed technologies have 
made a significant impact on the assessment and 
management of patients with DOC. Functional 
neuroimaging, PET and fMRI, as well as EEG 
and evoked potential studies have offered the 
possibility of objectively approaching covert 
cognitive processes in patients who are otherwise 
incapable of intelligible or sustained behavioral 
expression. Such studies have used experimental 
protocols to assess brain function during resting 
state conditions and after external stimulation. 
These technologies further gave the opportunity 
to some patients to show their ability to follow 
simple commands by modulating their brain 
activity, in the absence of verbal output. By such 
brain activity modulation, it was even possible 
to communicate with some of these patients who 
were otherwise diagnosed as unresponsive when 
merely assessed with behavioral tools.
Brain function in resting state & during 
passive stimulation
In resting conditions (i.e., while patients are not 
performing any kind of active task and/or receive 
no external stimulation), PET studies show 
that unresponsive patients are characterized 
by reduced global metabolism compared 
with healthy subjects. Interestingly, recovery 
from UWS does not necessarily coincide with 
resumption of global metabolic activity [17]. It 
rather seems that some areas are more important 
than others for conscious functions. For instance, 
patients with UWS show impaired metabolism 
in a widespread network encompassing midline 
(i.e., anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal and 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus) and lateral 
(i.e., prefrontal and posterior parietal) associative 
cortices, compared with healthy controls [18]. 
Importantly, the connection of these areas with 
the thalami is restored after recovery from UWS 
[19]. Using PET, we recently showed that UWS 
patients exhibit metabolic dysfunction in both 
external and internal awareness networks, as 
well as in the thalami, compared with healthy 
controls. On the contrary, we found that MCS 
patients showed dysfunction mostly in internal 
awareness network and thalami compared with 
healthy controls, which could reflect altered self-
awareness in these patients, which is difficult to 
quantify at the bedside [20].
In resting conditions, fMRI studies show 
that a network of brain areas seems to play an 
important role in sustaining consciousness. 
Posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal 
cortex and posterior parietal cortices (areas 
broadly known as the default mode network- 
DMN), show no functional connectivity in 
brain death  [21,22]. Additionally, the connectivity 
pattern of the default mode network was 
found to decrease as a function of the level 
of consciousness, ranging from controls and 
patients with LIS to MCS, UWS and coma [23]. 
Although the value of the fMRI resting state 
as a differential diagnostic tool remains to be 
determined, the potentially prognostic value of 
default mode network connectivity was shown 
in a cohort of patients in the acute stage of 
coma for whom the presence of default mode 
network functional connectivity was paralleled 
to subsequent reversibility of coma [24].
In resting conditions, various EEG paradigms 
have made an effort to differentiate between 
the clinical entities of DOC. The 15-min EEG 
resting state acquisitions showed that UWS 
patients had significantly lower connectivity 
than MCS in the T and D frequency bands [25]. 
Similarly, the bi-spectral index (a measure of the 
depth of anesthesia) was shown to discriminate 
between UWS and MCS patients [26]. The 
bi-spectral index was also positively correlated 
with behavioral scores of awareness at the time 
of testing and was associated with outcome 
results at 1-year post-trauma. Additionally, an 
EEG entropy score of 52 (value ranging from 
0 to 91, with higher scores indicating a higher 
consciousness level) was shown to be able 
to differentiate acute unconsciousness from 
MCS patients with 89% sensitivity and 90% 
specificity. However, the prognostic value of 
this measure was not high and hence cannot 
be recommended as a prognostic tool [27]. EEG 
studies measuring effective connectivity also 
seem able to differentiate between UWS and 
MCS patients. Effective connectivity is a measure 
of the causal relationship between brain areas. 
One study using mismatch negativity paradigm 
and applying dynamic causal modeling found 
that the only significant difference between 
UWS and MCS patients was an impairment of 
backward connectivity from frontal to temporal 
cortices [28]. The prognostic value of this test, 
however, needs to be further validated. In 
addition, when EEG effective connectivity was 
measured after the application of transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, it was found that UWS 
patients showed a simple, local response after 
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the transcranial magnetic stimulation pulses. By 
contrast, MCS patients showed more complex 
activations after the transcranial magnetic 
stimulation pulses, which involved distant 
cortical areas ipsi- and contra-lateral to the site 
of stimulation [29]. Other efforts have also been 
made to use EEG signal patterns as a prognostic 
tool for DOC patients. For example, it has 
been observed that UWS patients who made a 
behavioral recovery at 3-month follow-up showed 
higher occipital source power in the D band of 
resting EEG when compared with those who 
did not [30]. This implies that cortical sources 
of resting D rhythms might predict recovery in 
UWS patients’ behavior. Taken together, resting 
state studies with fMRI, PET and EEG provide 
an appropriate paradigm to study residual brain 
function in patients with DOC, thanks to its 
simple and fast application. It should be noted, 
however, that in terms of differential diagnosis, 
no A-level recommendations can be made yet 
favoring a particular type of testing. Large 
multicentric studies are necessary to validate 
their diagnostic power and to determine their 
prognostic value.
Importantly, brain responses to external 
stimuli provide valuable information not only 
on the preserved functional (and to some degree 
anatomical) connectivity among distinct brain 
regions, but also on the nature of detected 
responses. Potential pain perception capacities 
in MCS patients are suggested by findings of 
cerebral correlates of pain processing in a similar 
network as healthy controls [31]. The activation 
pattern was also much more widespread than 
in UWS patients. The type of stimuli used 
also seems to make a difference in responses. 
Stimuli with emotional valence (e.g., an infant 
cries the patient’s own name) induced a much 
more widespread activation in MCS patients 
compared with meaningless noise [32]. The 
activation pattern was comparable with that 
previously obtained in healthy controls. Patients 
with DOC also showed higher fMRI activity in 
the anterior cingulate cortex after to listening to 
their own name as compared with listening to a 
familiar name and this activity correlated with 
the behaviorally assessed level of consciousness 
of the patient [33]. Such results imply that self-
referential stimuli, such as one’s own name, are 
attention grabbing, and therefore can be used 
in the assessment of residual brain function of 
these patients.
A number of studies have used event-related 
potentials (ERPs; averages of segments of 
EEG locked to the presentation of a stimulus) 
to assess patients with DOC. Although early 
‘exogenous components’ (elicited within 100 ms 
after stimulus presentation) are known to persist 
even in unconsciousness, later ‘endogenous’ ERP 
components (e.g., P300 – i.e., showing a positive 
peak 300 ms after stimulus presentation) can 
be used to infer conscious cognitive processing 
of information [34]. In several ERP studies, the 
detection of the patients’ own name was used 
in order to assess residual linguistic preservation 
and self-processing. When the patient’s own 
name was presented infrequently among other 
names, a differential P300 was observed in 
LIS, MCS and UWS patients, suggesting that 
the auditory system was relatively preserved 
in response to language stimulation [33,35]. In 
another passive oddball experiment, six out 
of 27 patients in UWS or MCS produced a 
reliable P300 response to violations of prosody 
in non-linguistic emotional exclamations 
[36]. This suggests a high level of cognitive 
processing for auditory stimuli beyond their 
most basic features in patients with DOC. A 
direct challenge with activation studies is that, 
in the absence of subjective contribution from 
patients, a similar-to-control brain activation 
pattern cannot necessarily be interpreted as 
evidence of a conscious percept.
Functional neuroimaging 
& electrophysiology as tools for 
command following & communication
A willful modulation of brain activity to a 
certain command can be an alternative way 
to evidence awareness in the absence of motor 
output. In a collaborative study between the 
Universities of Cambridge (UK) and Liège 
(Belgium), we showed that a patient who was 
behaviorally diagnosed as in UWS could follow 
simple commands using fMRI [37]. In particular, 
when the patient was asked to imagine playing 
tennis and walking through her house, she 
activated the supplementary motor area and 
parahippocampal area, respectively. These 
specific activation patterns were not different 
from those previously observed in a cohort of 
healthy volunteers [38]. Since this report, similar 
command-following paradigms in patients with 
DOC have asked patients to ‘look at a screen 
and silently name the objects as they appear’ 
(resulting in language network activation) [39], 
‘move your hand’ (resulting in premotor cortex 
activation) [40], ‘imagine swimming’ (resulting 
in supplementary motor area activation) [41] and 
recently also to ‘focus on either the face or house 
of an overlaid image’ [42].
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Similarly, active paradigms have been 
attempted with cheaper and portable EEG-
based technologies. In the case of a young 
comatose woman who failed to show any 
motor signs of conscious awareness, command 
following was only able to detect evoked 
potentials by means of EEG, therefore leading 
to the diagnosis of total LIS (i.e., characterized 
by complete immobility including all eye 
movements) at the intensive care unit [43]. The 
task was to count a target name or her own 
name in a list of other names. A previous study 
using this task demonstrated that while most 
MCS patients exhibited increased amplitude 
of the P300 when instructed to count, no task-
related P300 changes were observed in UWS 
patients [44]. Similarly, conscious processing was 
detected in three out of four MCS patients who 
were instructed to actively count the number 
of deviant trials in a series of sound, while no 
responses were recorded in UWS patients [45]. A 
number of studies have demonstrated that EEG 
power spectral ana lysis can be used as a flexible 
bedside tool to demonstrate awareness in brain-
injured patients who are otherwise unable to 
communicate [46–48].
These command-following paradigms have 
been further developed in order to be used 
as communication systems. In these studies, 
differentiation between ‘brain responses’ was 
used as proxy for behavioral responses. Using 
the same mental imagery paradigm [37], Monti 
et al. demonstrated that a DOC patient was able 
to use the modulation of his brain activity to 
reliably answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to simple questions, 
even though no signs of communication had 
ever been found through bedside examination 
[49]. As noted above, EEG was used with similar 
motor imagery paradigms, with the advantage of 
being cheaper and possible to use at the patient’s 
bedside [50,51]. Using an auditory P300-based 
brain–computer interface, command following 
was accurately detected in healthy volunteers, and 
the same technique was then applied to establish 
brain–computer interface-based communication 
with healthy controls [52,53]. Accuracy of this 
technique with patients in MCS is still lower 
than for controls, but several ways to improve 
it are being studied. Finally, brain–computer 
interface applications in UWS patients are not 
clear and need to be evidence based.
It should be stressed that when there is no 
brain activation after a command to perform a 
mental imagery task, this does not allow strong 
claims about the absence of consciousness. 
Many possible causes could indeed account for 
negative responses. Many possible causes could 
lead to negative outcomes. Corrupted signals 
due to movement or other artifacts are often 
encountered in these patients and are particularly 
troublesome in fMRI experiments [54]. Indeed, 
in many cases patients can show increased 
motion in the scanner, which can hinder their 
evaluation on fMRI paradigms. In these cases, 
patients will need to be scanned under sedation 
or anesthesia. Therefore, only fMRI resting 
state acquisitions can be performed. The future 
challenge of this practice is twofold: first, to 
determine whether increased motion is in any 
way correlated to higher awareness levels; and 
second, to determine what kind of residual 
cognition is measured under such a sedated 
condition. Patient-dependent fluctuations could 
also be encountered due to their level of arousal 
(spontaneous or medication related). Lastly, 
since the discussed mental imagery, motor or 
attentional tasks require preservation of different 
cognitive processes (such as visual, auditory, 
language and working memory functions), 
perceptual, sensory or cognitive insufficiencies 
might also hamper positive outcomes. However, 
while negative results do not necessarily reflect 
proof of absence of consciousness, positive 
results are informative and relatively easy 
to interpret as a proof of consciousness. The 
neural responses required for these types of 
tasks are not produced automatically by the 
eliciting stimulus, but rather, depend on time-
dependent and sustained responses generated 
by the participant, and can therefore be used 
as a neural proxy of behavior for identifying 
conscious awareness. On the contrary, 
unconscious mental representations are usually 
observed in clinical and experimental contexts 
to be fleeting, lasting only a few seconds or less 
[55,56]. In any case, in order to minimize false 
positives and to enhance our understanding of 
the interaction between brain and behavior, 
we suggest that future investigations take the 
correlation between behavioral scores and 
neuroimaging data into account, which has been 
previously suggested [57] and performed [20,58].
Challenges for clinical practice
The evaluation of severely brain-damaged 
patients is extremely challenging and if one 
relies merely on behavioral responses when 
evaluating remnants of conscious behavior, 
they can be misled. Erroneous diagnosis in 
behavioral examination can have various 
sources. The patient might have limited 
physical capacities (e.g., generalized hypotonus, 
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spasticity or paralysis) or cognitive function 
(e.g., aphasia, apraxia, agnosia), fluctuations 
in arousal level, fatigue, subclinical seizure 
activity, occult illness, pain or cortical sensory 
deficits (e.g., cortical blindness/deafness). 
Sedating medications, restricted range of 
movement stemming from restraints and 
immobilization techniques, poor positioning 
and excessive ambient noise, heat or light 
can decrease or distort voluntary behavioral 
responses [59]. Diagnostic accuracy might be 
diminished further if the range of behaviors 
sampled is too narrow, response time-windows 
are over- or under-inclusive and examinations 
are conducted too infrequently to capture the 
full range of behavioral fluctuation [16]. Error 
in diagnosis with patients with DOC can have 
serious consequences in clinical management, 
from treatment of pain to end-of life decisions. 
As a consequence, it has been estimated that 
approximately 40% of patients with DOC 
are erroneously given the clinical consensus 
diagnosis of UWS [60,61]. We recently showed 
that, despite the introduction of the clinical 
criteria for the MCS, this diagnostic error rate 
has not substantially changed since the 1990s 
[16]. As we discussed above, with the progressive 
use of paraclinical technologies, we can now 
detect subclinical signs of awareness, otherwise 
not evidenced at the bedside [49].
For clinicians, prognosis and the prediction 
of clinical outcome are among the most 
challenging issues when they face patients’ 
caregivers and/or hospita ls’ resources. 
According to the Multi-Society Task Force 
on persistent VS, unresponsive patients of 
traumatic etiology show better improvement 
up to 12 months after injury compared with 
UWS patients of non-traumatic etiology [62]. It 
should be noted that this work was conducted 
before the definition and diagnostic criteria for 
MCS. Hence, it is likely that the studied cohort 
of patients could have been composed of both 
UWS and MCS patients. We now know that 
these two clinical entities are not characterized 
by the same clinical outcome. Indeed, it has 
been shown that 50% of all MCS patients 
progress to moderate to no disability 12 months 
after injury, whereas less than 5% of UWS 
patients achieve this level of improvement 
[63]. It has also been shown that the rate of 
recovery in the acute setting is correlated with 
a better chance of recovery and better outcome 
[64]. Nevertheless, little is known about long-
term prognosis and outcome in these patients. 
Even if late recovery (>3 months post-injury) 
of patients in non-traumatic UWS is unusual, 
it has been documented, albeit with very poor 
functional outcome [65]. A number of highly 
publicized patients, like the case of Terry Wallis 
who was considered to be in a VS, made the 
headlines when he started to speak 19 years 
after his car accident [66]. We should note that 
such cases appear sporadically in the academic 
literature and do not suffice to change the 
clinical taxonomy of VS/UWS. Rather, they 
highlight the unfortunate connotation of a 
refutable clinical evolution linked to the names 
of VS/UWS. We think that larger studies on 
clinical outcome including information on 
patients’ anatomical and functional lesions will 
eventually clarify the underlying mechanisms 
of fast and late recoveries. In MCS patients, 
late recovery seems to be more frequent. Up to 
30% of patients in MCS can emerge from this 
stage after more than 1 year spent as minimally 
conscious. The functional outcome, however, 
remains very poor for these patients and most 
of them need to remain institutionalized [67].
Paraclinical techniques have also been used 
for prognostic purposes. So far, ERPs are used 
extensively in intensive care to predict clinical 
outcome. A meta-ana lysis has demonstrated 
that the mismatch negativity (MMN; an early 
negative component of the auditory ERP elicited 
by a deviant tone in the repetitive stimuli and 
thus thought to reflect sound discrimination) 
and the P300 component can predict awakening 
from coma [68]. Another study has also 
highlighted the predictive value for the N100 
component (a negative component of auditory 
ERP indicating some level of processing at the 
sensory cortex level) [69]. A decision tree-based 
classification has shown that MMN, pupillary 
light reflex and somatosensory-evoked potentials 
can be used to accurately predict a significant 
chance of awakening (if MMN is present) or 
the probability of non-awakening (if MMN 
and either somatosensory-evoked potentials 
or pupillary light reflex are absent) [70]. Using 
fMRI, stimuli with emotional valence such as 
infant cries [32] or the patient’s own name [71] 
can also be informative of patients’ prognosis. 
Indeed, it was shown that two patients with 
UWS who showed widespread activation after 
listening to their own name subsequently 
showed clinical improvement to MCS observed 
3 months after their fMRI scan [72].
For some investigators, efforts should be 
focused on refining prognostic methods rather 
than focusing on differential diagnosis [73]. We 
think, however, that proper decision-making 
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can only be made once a valid diagnosis is 
established. For example, we have shown that 
opinions about clinical diagnosis influence views 
on pain perception. In a wide European survey 
among clinicians, the majority of participants 
agreed more with pain perception in MCS 
compared with UWS patients [74]. Similarly, 
a decision about treatment withdrawal was 
supported more for UWS and significantly less 
for MCS patients [75]. Finally, we also showed 
that for UWS patients, treatment limitation was 
supported more when participants recognized 
pain perception in these patients (FIGURE 1). These 
data suggest that medico-ethical controversies 
still exist for UWS and are inf luenced by 
personal characteristics (e.g., profession, 
religious beliefs and region of origin). As 
personal opinions can mediate medical practice 
[76] we think that treatment guidelines should 
take clinicians’ attitudes into account in future 
formulations [77].
For several decades, researchers and clinicians 
have tried to identify potential means to 
promote arousal and awareness in patients 
with DOC. Medical treatments can vary from 
preventing infections (with nutrition and tendon 
retraction) to more invasive interventions 
with pharmacological or surgical procedures. 
In terms of pharmacological interventions, 
aminergic and neurostimulant agents seem to 
be the most promising for patients with DOC. 
Zolpidem (a non-benzodiazepine sedative drug 
that is used for insomnia in healthy individuals) 
was shown to be effective to promote arousal 
and awareness, albeit in a small proportion of 
the patients [78]. The paradoxical effect of this 
sleeping pill was first shown in 2000 [79] and 
was since then verified and tested on larger 
patient groups [78–80]. The current hypothesis 
suggests that zolpidem acts by inducing a direct 
inhibition of the globus pallidus (an inhibitory 
structure of the brain), thus liberating the 
corticothalamic pathway leading to frontal 
cortices [81]. Amantadine (known for its 
dopaminergic and NMDA agonist effects) 
was only recently studied in a randomized 
controlled trial [82]. The drug was shown to 
be highly effective in promoting arousal and 
awareness in MCS patients following traumatic 
accidents.
Painkillers are also often given as treatment 
for patients with DOC. Nevertheless, even for 
this basic treatment, a number of problems 
arise. First of all, assessing the feeling of pain 
in non-communicating patients is challenging 
because pain is a subjective sensation [77]. As 
such, patients with DOC by definition cannot 
provide self-ratings for feelings of pain. We have, 
therefore, introduced the Nociception Coma 
Scale to behaviorally assess painful sensations 
in DOC patients in a standardized way [83]. 
Initially comprised of four different subscales, 
now with three in the revised version, it allows 
the clinician to evaluate whether there is a need 
to adapt the analgesic treatment [84]. Second, 
although we know that UWS and MCS patients 
do not process painful stimuli the same way, an 
absent response to pain cannot be considered as 
absence of pain perception. Using neuroimaging, 
we have shown that there are differences in the 
way UWS and MCS patients process painful 
stimulation. Patients in UWS do not process 
noxious stimuli further than in the primary 
sensory cortex, preventing this sensation from 
being regarded as painful [85]. As patients in 
MCS show additional activation of high-order 
associative cortices (similar to healthy controls), 
we assume pain perception [31]. To date, it remains 
unclear whether pain should or should not be 
treated the same way in all DOC patients [86]. In 
light of an incomplete understanding of pain and 
suffering in these states, we think that pain should 
be closely monitored in non-communicating 
patients, and treated carefully.
In terms of nonpharmacological interventions, 
deep brain stimulation of the thalamus showed 




















Treatment can be stopped in
chronic VS/UWS
p < 0.001
Figure 1. The ascription of pain perception 
in unresponsive patients correlates with 
opinions on treatment limitation in this 
patient population. In a wide European 
survey among clinicians, the more respondents 
who recognized pain perception in patients in a 
VS/UWS, the less they agreed with treatment 
withdrawal in this condition. 
UWS: Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; 
VS: Vegetative state. 
Adapted with permission from [77].
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behavioral improvements in a MCS patient, 
6 years after the traumatic accident [87]. This 
technique is hypothesized to work by promoting 
activation of large preserved but disconnected 
thalamocortical networks. Despite its promising 
therapeutic application, deep brain stimulation 
of the thalamus in non-communicating patients 
needs to be further standardized in a larger 
cohort of patients of various etiologies. Lastly, 
non-invasive sensory stimulations (including 
several paradigms such as environmental 
enhancement and tactile stimulations) have 
been tested under the hypothesis that increasing 
brain inputs would promote neuroplasticity and 
hence patients would achieve a better outcome 
[88]. Likewise, these techniques lack  evidence-
based recommendations.
Conclusion & future perspective
In the last decade, we have viewed the 
development and the validation of standardized 
behavioral scales and neuroimaging/EEG 
techniques to better understand patients with 
DOC. The number of published scientif ic 
articles seems to rise exponentially, with more 
than 2000 articles published in last decade 
(FIGURE 2). Such scientific advances have led, at 
least to a certain degree, to new subdivisions 
of existing diagnostic entities (i.e., MCS±). We 
expect that with continuous scientific advances 
in the research of patients with DOC, further 
subdivisions could arise. At first glance, changes 
in clinical taxonomy might seem to complicate 
the diagnostic picture around DOC patients. 
However, we think that new knowledge coming 
from assisting technologies will need to be 
incorporated in the existing clinical diagnostic 
procedures when accessibly possible. It is 
true that in many cases many neuroimaging 
technologies are not widely accessible for 
clinical research. This can either be owing 
to high costs or as a result of simultaneous 
machine use by several other disciplines. In 
addition, the statistical ana lysis of such data 
may require substantial training. Similarly, 
moving from group-level to single patient-level 
ana lysis is statistically challenging but clinically 
salient. In the end, it is of great importance to 
be able to differentiate DOC patients based 
on their brain data for clinical practice. So far, 
studies have focused on how patient groups in 
different clinical entities differ among each 
other as a function of decreased consciousness 
level [23]. We think that with the introduction 
of automated statistical classifiers, the ability 
of neuroimaging and electrophysiological 
techniques to differentiate UWS, MCS±, 
emerged MCS and functional LIS patients will 
be enhanced. We have shown, for instance, that 
a classifier trained on healthy controls, PET 
































1980 1990 2000 2010 Year
Figure 2. With the passage of time and the rise in application of new technologies for brain 
function assessment (as evidenced by the number of published studies), the nosology of 
disorders of consciousness also evolved. Although this pattern is not necessarily causal, it 
nevertheless shows the significant contribution of paraclinical assessment in promoting our 
understanding on residual cognition in patients with disorders of consciousness. Online research 
performed on Pubmed with the terms “EEG”, “PET”, “MRI” or “fMRI” and “coma”, “vegetative state” 
and “minimally conscious state”, as keywords on a time span of 10 years each time from 1940 to 2012. 
fMRI: Functional MRI; LIS: Locked-in syndrome; MCS: Minimally conscious state; UWS: Unresponsive 
wakefulness syndrome; VS: Vegetative state.
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data could classify conscious subjects from 
unconscious patients with 100% classification 
accuracy; all LIS patients were also classified as 
‘conscious’ [89]. For some investigators, however, 
efforts should not be focused necessarily on 
differential diagnosis, but rather on refining 
prognostic methods [73]. We think that only 
with an accurate and valid diagnosis can we 
proceed with outcome estimation and design 
effective treatments. Indeed, clinical prognosis 
requires the study of a large cohort of patients 
evaluated with standardized assessment tools 
(e.g., with the Coma Recovery Scale – Revised). 
Currently, it is not well established as to what 
a good outcome for patients with DOC is. 
Should one, for instance, set the threshold of 
good outcome to functional recovery and social 
integration? If positive, then patients evolving 
to LIS are not considered as recovered patients. 
Furthermore, can we determine a specific time 
point after which we are certain at a p = 0.05 
level that this patient is not expected to recover 
any more? How do we deal with late recoveries 
from UWS [65]? Future multicentric studies are 
expected to shed more light on the spectrum 
of consciousness and provide sensitivity and 
specificity values regarding clinical outcome.
Aside from the diagnostic and prognostic 
value of neuroimaging and EEG-based tools, 
these technologies are beginning to be used 
as alternative means for command following 
and communication. We think that in the 
future such means will need to be further 
validated as an appropriate way for some 
patients to express their wishes. What remains 
to be shown is whether such technologies can 
be used as evidence of the expressed will of a 
competent patient. For example, how can a 
negative response of an ‘unresponsive’ patient 
to the question of whether they want to 
continue to live can be considered as a reliable 
response to be respected? Similarly, should pain 
treatment in a MCS patient change once they 
communicate that they suffer? Should proving 
consciousness in these patients be considered as 
piece of evidence to be celebrated, or can it work 
against patients’ and families’ best interests? 
These aforementioned questions require 
answers that future establishment of ethical 
and legal provisions can provide. To date, the 
US law authorizes withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration without analgesics, if these patients 
have been stable for more than 12 months in 
the case of traumatic etiology and 3 months for 
anoxic etiology [90]. The problem is that this 
decision is based on a third person view; it is 
a decision they would make for their patients 
and not for themselves [75]. We would like to 
mention that here we do not aim to directly 
change the law based on such sporadic clinical 
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Executive summary
Disorders of consciousness
 The recent re-definition of vegetative state as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, the subcategorization of minimally conscious 
state (MCS) into MCS+ and MCS- and the introduction of functional locked in syndrome enrich the spectrum of disorders of 
consciousness.
Clinical assessment of patients with disorders of consciousness
 Standardized behavioral evaluation of consciousness must be used for its clinical assessment.
 Although the Coma Recovery Scale – Revised is the most recommended scale, deficiencies in criterion validity and diagnostic validity 
need to be targeted in future research.
Neuroimaging
 Resting state studies with neuroimaging technologies have shown consciousness to be an emergent property of widespread  
thalamo-corticalfrontoparietal network connectivity.
 Cognitive processing assessed in passive stimulation studies can provide valuable prognostic and diagnostic information.
 Novel imaging paradigms could show command following in behaviorally unresponsive patients.
 Functional MRI and electroencephalography-based brain–computer interfaces for two-way communication with some behaviorally 
unresponsive patients have been established and more sophisticated communicative bedside devices are being developed.
Challenges for clinical practice
 Prognosis remains to be further studied in the new entities of disorders of consciousness. Outcome and recovery are influenced by 
diagnosis, etiology and time spent in a disorder of consciousness.
 Promising pharmacologic (zolpidem and amantadine) and non-pharmacologic (deep brain stimulation) treatments should be tested in 
large-scale double-blind randomized clinical trials.
 Pain management can be improved by using the Nociception Coma Scale – Revised. 
 End-of-life decisions and other ethical issues could be probed in the future through brain–computer interface communication; however, 
using such indirect means of communication for such grave questions remains controversial.
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